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Introduction 
The perennial debate in the United States 
over the impact of defense spending on the 
economy has been heating up. Those who 
favor smaller military budgets cite the high 
"opportunity cost" of diverting vital scientific 
and technological resources from productive 
civilian pursuits -- a diversion, they argue, 
that undermines productivity at home and 
competitiveness abroad. Advocates of this 
view also try to show that a dollar (or rather 
a billion dollars) for defense produces fewer 
jobs than the same amount of money devoted 
to non-military expenditures. High levels of 
defense spending, they conclude, are eco-
nomically unsound and sap the nation's 
prospects for growth. 
Another widely circulated criticism is that 
of historian and best-selling author Paul 
Kennedy. In The Rise and Fall of the Great 
Powers he warns that too large a proportion 
of a nation's resources allocated to military 
purposes rather than ''wealth creation" is 
likely to lead to "a weakening of national 
power over the longer term." Kennedy 
specifically raises the specter of "global over-
stretch" on the part of the United States. 
(On occasion, he refers to his concern as 
"imperial overstretch.") 
Murray Weidenbaum is Director of the Center for 
the Study of American Business and Mallinckrodt 
Distinguished University Professor at Washington 
University in St. Louis. This study is adapted from 
an article appearing in The National Interest, Issue 
Number 16, Summer 1989. Copyright 1989, Na-
tional Affairs, Inc. 
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For their part, the proponents of larger 
military budgets cite what they believe to be 
the signal advantages of defense spending. 
Chief among these, they argue, are the favor-
able "spinoffs" of defense technology into 
high-growth electronics, instruments, and 
aerospace industries. These advocates also 
focus on the large number of high-paying in-
dustrial jobs created by military outlays 
(35,000 jobs for each $1 billion of defense 
spending, according to former Secretary of 
Defense Caspar Weinberger). 
It is fascinating to compare these two sets 
of self-serving arguments, for they are liter-
ally mirror images of each other. Both camps 
are united by the idea that defense spending 
has powerful impacts on the economy, 
whether for good or ill. Yet the truth seems 
to be quite different. The economic experi-
ence of the period since World War II shows 
that both critics and supporters of defense 
spending have seriously overestimated its 
importance. 
Defense spending does generate broader 
benefits than the obvious national security 
benefits. Military research and development 
produces important technological "spill-
overs" into the civilian sector. The education, 
training, and physical conditioning that young 
men and women obtain in the armed forces 
are of obvious benefit to society as well as to 
themselves -- especially when those skills are 
applied to civilian occupations. However, 
military outlays are rarely the most efficient 
way of securing these desirable side effects. 
A new treatment for AIDS, to take one 
example of obvious importance, is more 
likely to come from medical research than 
from work on the strategic defense system. 
The naysayers on defense have likewise 
overstated their case. Despite high levels of 
defense spending, new civilian jobs are being 
created rapidly in the United States -- far 
more rapidly than the nations in Western Eu-
rope who devote much smaller shares of their 
GNP to defense. Since the end of World 
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War II, in fact, the relative importance of de-
fense to the economy of the United States 
has been declining. Different ways of gaug-
ing resource use over the past half century 
support this statement. Defense outlays have 
accounted for a declining share of the GNP 
(see Figure 1 ), a declining portion of the fed-
eral budget, and a diminishing portion of the 
nation's research and development funding. 
Defense manpower has represented a de-
clining fraction of the nation's work for~e. 
Military outlays now represent only one-fif-
teenth of the GNP and an even smaller pro-
portion of the nation's work force. 
The relative importance of 
defense to the economy of the 
United States has been declining 
since the end of World War II. 
Few of the largest industries produce sig-
nificant portions of their output for the mili-
tary. Many of the major defense contractors 
sell the bulk of their products in civilian mar-
kets. Moreover, long periods of relative de-
cline in the military's use of research and 
development and other high-powered re-
sources have not resulted in comparable in-
creases in civilian demand, much less a pick-
up in U.S. productivity and growth rates. The 
decade from the mid-1960s to mid-1970s 
provides a striking case in point. 
More recently, an analysis of the eco-
nomic impact of the military buildup of the 
early 1980s found no evidence of any "major 
disruptive effect" of defense expenditures. 
No substantial bottlenecks were encountered. 
If anything, defense spending served as an 
unplanned counter-recessionary force in the 
1981-82 downturn.l 
The economy of the United States is both 
complex and massive. It is not readily pro-
pelled or retarded by the relatively small 
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Source: U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 
Historical Tables, Budget of the United 
States Govemment, Fiscal Year 1989. 
share of GNP devoted to military outlays. 
And the power of the U.S. economy to adjust 
is substantial. 
Changing Trends in U.S. 
Military Outlays 
What then has been the actual impact of 
military spending on the United States and 
its position in the world? From a modest 
level of about $1 billion in fiscal year 1938, 
the outlays of the Department of Defense 
rose to approximately $285 billion in fiscal 
year 1988 (see Table 1). That, of course, was 
a far more rapid increase than occurred in 
the population of the country or the size of 
the economy, or both. A similar upward 
trend is visible if the data are corrected for 
inflation -- or if manpower levels are used in-
stead of dollar figures, although the annual 
fluctuations are quite different in some time 
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Year 
1940 
1945 
1950 
1955 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1985 
1988a 
Table 1 
INDICATORS OF U.S. DEFENSE 
OUTLAYS, 1940-1988 
In Billions In Billions 
of Current of Constant FY 
Dollars 1982 Dollars 
1.7 15.1 
83.0 591.3 
13.7 83.9 
42.7 211.0 
48.1 192.1 
50.6 181.4 
81.7 225.6 
86.5 159.8 
134.0 164.0 
252.7 229.4 
285.4 243.5 
aEstimated. 
Source: U.S. Office of Management and Budget. 
periods. Because the overall American econ-
omy was expanding during the sa.me peri?d, 
it is useful to focus on the changmg relative 
position of military outlays. 
The most substantial absolute and relative 
expansion in U.S. defense expenditures oc-
curred during World War II. In the years 
since the deep and rapid postwar demobiliza-
tion two limited-war expansions occurred (Ko~ea and Vietnam), plus a buildup in the 
early and middle 1980s. 
The most important fact that emerges 
from the historical record is that the relative 
importance of defense to the American 
economy has been declining since the end of 
World War II. To be sure, the pattern is un-
even. Nevertheless, the Korean peak of 14 
percent of GNP was far below the World 
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War II high of 39 percent, and Vietnam War 
outlays were proportionately lower (less than 
10 percent of GNP) than during the Korean 
period. 
To a large extent, the decline 
in the military share of the 
federal budget during the 1970s 
resulted from the more rapid growth 
in civilian program outlays. 
~he high reached in the Reagan adminis-
tratH~n was a comparatively modest 6.5 per-
cent m 1986 and 1987 -- a ratio that was ex-
ceeded in many peacetime years in the 1950s 
and 1960s. Declines in that ratio are almost 
inevitable in the near future because of the 
s~bstantial reductions in defense appropria-
tiOns, and hence in the ability to make for-
ward commitments, that Congress has en-
acted during the last several years. Thus, 
ov~r. ~ very significant time period, military 
activities have been a gradually smaller factor 
it;t the American economy. In the 30-year pe-
nod from 1958 to 1988, the military share of 
~he U.S. GNP declined in 17 years, was stable 
m 1, and rose in 12 years. In striking con-
trast, civilian spending has been the growth 
area o~ this nati?n's economic activity. 
It IS also mstructive to evaluate the 
changing role of defense in national priori-
ties. The most widely used measure of that 
relationship is to estimate the share of fed-
eral government outlays directed to defense. 
The trend here is basically similar to that for 
the ratio of defense spending to the GNP. 
The large portion of the federal budget di-
rected to defense outlays during World War 
I~ -- over 90 percent -- has not been equalled 
smce. A secondary peak occurred during the 
Korean War, when defense spending ac-
counted for almost 70 percent of the budget. 
Since then, the defense share of the fed-
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eral budget has declined to a low of less than 
23 percent in 1980. It reversed to a high of 
28 percent in 1987 and is now declining. Ac-
count should be taken of the substantial ex-
pansion in the scope of federal civilian re-
sponsibilities during the 1960s, especially the 
Great Society programs. To a large extent, 
therefore, the decline in the military share of 
the federal budget during the 1970s resulted 
from the more rapid growth in civilian pro-
gram outlays. 
It is ironic to note that the administra-
tion's staunchness in preserving the defense 
b~d~et in the early 1980s made it politically 
difficul~ to make deep cuts in non-military 
expenditures. Proponents of civilian spend-
ing ra~sed the issue of "fairness" in limiting 
reductiOns to non-defense programs. During 
the 1980s, federal civilian expenditures con-
tinued to rise in real terms and also tended to 
maintain a relatively constant share of the 
GNP. This experience runs counter to the 
common belief that expansions in defense 
spending invariably come at the expense of 
civilian government outlays. 
Nevertheless, military outlays are now un-
der considerable pressure because of general 
budgetary trends in recent years. A combina-
ti.o?. of rapid ~xpansions in both military and 
civilian sp~ndmg programs in the early 1980s, 
coupled With substantial reductions in income 
tax. r~tes, led to .unparalleled large budget 
def~c~ts. The persistence of these triple-digit 
deficits beyond the 1981-82 recession led to 
institutional restraints on federal spending 
(the CJ:r~mm-Rudman-Hollings legislation). 
The military budget was a major target of 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings and increases in 
appropriations for the Department of De-
fense by the mid-1980s were less than the 
amount necessary to keep up with inflation. 
Surely, the absolute size of defense pur-
chases of goods and services looms large by 
all available statistical measures. The De-
partment of Defense is a major "customer" of 
American business. Nevertheless, the overall 
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pattern is clear: the economic impact of de-
fense activities in the United States peaked 
decades ago and has been declining -- albeit 
irregularly -- ever since. 
Military Use of Key Resources 
What should we make of the concern over 
the American military's supposed ill use of 
key resources? An analysis of the changing 
importance of the military demand for key 
factors of production is revealing; it hardly 
supports the contention of a society 
"depleted" by a military establishment hog-
ging the vital resources of the nation. 
The armed forces now represent only 1.7 
percent of the total U.S. labor force, down 
from a post-World War II peak of 4.3 percent 
in 1955, but also down from 2.2 percent in 
1975 (see Table 2). During the same general 
period, the proportional decline in the mili-
tary share of funding for research and devel-
opment has been dramatic. In 1960, the De-
partment of Defense obtained the lion's 
share of the nation's scientific and techno-
logical resources -- 62 percent. By 1980, the 
ratio had plummeted to 25 percent. In 1987, 
the preliminary data show a 30 percent share 
for the military -- less than one-half the 1960 
proportion. 
On the other hand, whatever their relative 
or absolute size, the resources allocated to 
national defense are not available for civilian 
purposes. Especially in a fully employed 
economy, it is reasonable to assume that, in 
the absence of the military's demand, much 
of those resources would have gone to meet 
civilian needs (or wants). The question then 
arises as to which areas of the civilian econ-
omy would use the resources that would be-
come available following a reduction in mili-
tary budgets. To an economist, the "oppor-
tunity cost" of expenditures for defense is the 
opportunity forgone to use the people, ma-
chinery, and materials in other ways. 
8 
~ Year 
1940 
1945 
1950 
1955 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
Table 2 
CHANGING MILITARY USE OF 
RESOURCES, 1940-1988 
Military 
Manpower 
Percentage 
of Labor 
Force 
.8 
18.3 
2.3 
4.3 
3.5 
3.4 
3.6 
2.2 
1.9 
1.8 
1.8 
1.8 
1.7 
Military R&D 
Percentage 
ofU.S.R&D 
39.0 
61.6 
46.2 
37.6 
30.5 
24.6 
28.3 
30.7 
30.3 
Source: Department of Defense and National 
Science Foundation. 
Investment versus Consumption 
Do increases in defense spending come 
primarily out of resources that otherwise 
would be devoted to investment (a primary 
ingredient in economic growth)? To the ex-
tent that such is the case, the "opportunity 
cost" of defense spending is high. Every dol-
lar devoted to defense would mean a dollar 
less invested in the future of the economy. 
However, if the money spent for defense 
would otherwise go for current consumption 
-- for items that generate little or no future 
benefit -- then the true cost of defense is 
transitory and much lower. Researchers who 
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have looked into the matter are not in uni-
versal agreement. The possibility of defense 
demands crowding out private investment 
rests on the notion that a large and growing 
federal deficit forces the Treasury to expand 
its presence in capital markets, putting up-
ward pressure on interest rates. Rising inter-
est rates, in turn, inhibit capital formation.2 
The empirical evidence on the causal rela-
tionship between budget deficits and interest 
rates is not very impressive, however.3 
Increases in the share of GNP 
devoted to defense are accompanied 
by reductions in the proportion 
going to consumption, rather 
than to investment. 
It turns out that, in most cases in the 
United States, increases in the share of GNP 
devoted to defense are accompanied by re-
ductions in the proportion going to consump-
tion, rather than to investment. Kenneth 
Boulding has obtained such results using an 
analytical approach based on national income 
accounts.4 The substantial rise in personal 
income tax collections in the period since 
World War II helps to explain this trend. 
Civilian versus Military R&D 
Another charge one often hears is that 
military spending on research and develop-
ment "crowds out" civilian R&D. Let us ex-
amine the period between 1949 and 1988, for 
which detailed data are available. In only 16 
of those 39 years did the military and civilian 
shares of the federal budget move in opposite 
directions. In 18 of those years, the shares of 
the federal budget devoted to civilian R&D 
and to military R&D moved in the same di-
rection -- the civilian R&D portion rising 
when the military R&D share rose, and 
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falling when the military share fell. In 5 
other years, the civil sector registered no 
change in its share of the federal budget. 
The "depletion" thesis does not hold up. 
Expanding military R&D is at least as likely 
to have a positive effect on civilian R&D as 
the negative impact that is so often envi-
sioned. Moreover, reducing the military 
R&D share of the federal budget is as likely 
to have a negative effect on civilian R&D as 
a positive effect. 
The U.S. and the Global Economy 
There is no shortage of studies that pur-
port to show a close relationship between the 
concentration of a nation's economy on de-
fense and its poor economic performance. 
Thus, the argument goes, the United States 
spends proportionately more on defense than 
Japan and, therefore, we have a consistently 
lower rate of economic growth. Yet South 
Korea, which devotes a larger share of its 
GNP to defense than Japan, boasts a more 
rapid growth rate. To jump to a heroic con-
clusion from either comparison is surely sim-
ple-minded. 
Other factors -- such as the national sav-
ing rate -- are important influences on a na-
tion's growth rate. Still, since it has become 
fashionable to equate the comparatively large 
percentage of U.S. GNP devoted to defense 
with the slippage in the U.S. share of world 
trade and global economic activity, let us pur-
sue that point. 
It is easy to show that the United States 
has lost its supremacy in the global economy 
in the four decades since the end of World 
War II. In 1950, the gross national product 
of the United States represented approxi-
mately 45 percent of the world's gross prod-
uct. In the last few years, in striking contrast, 
the U.S. share has dropped to about one-
fourth of the global total. 
Again, some historical perspective is use-
11 
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ful. In 1950, the economies of Western Eu-
rope and Japan were still recovering from the 
devastation of World War II. Under those 
circumstances, the American economic giant 
had little difficulty dominating world mar-
kets. But such a powerful position was bound 
to be transitory, as the economic competitors 
regained their traditional strength -- with 
much help from the United States. The cur-
rent relative position of the United States is 
little different from what it was in 1938. 
It is intriguing to note that the Soviet 
Union did not take such a benign attitude. It 
shackled the economies of defeated nations 
within the sphere of its control. The poor 
economic performance of the Soviet bloc 
economies in the period since World War II, 
however, is hardly a tribute to that approach. 
Statistical comparisons, favorable or unfa-
vorable, have their limitations. Thus, in the 
1950s and 1960s -- when the economic power 
of the United States was rarely questioned --
a rapid spread of collectivist and anti-market 
policies occurred in many parts of Western 
Europe and Asia. In the 1980s, however, 
during the period of supposed U.S. decline, 
this trend has been reversed. In many parts 
of the world a dramatic expansion has oc-
curred in the role of market forces, economic 
incentives, price competition, and the privati-
zation of economic activity. Great Britain 
and China provide two very different but 
equally impressive examples of this powerful 
change. 
The doom peddlers always seem to have a 
field day in competing for public attention. 
Yet the United States remains the leading 
power in the world. In 1988, America's 
farms, mines, factories, and offices produced 
almost $5 trillion of goods and services -- a 
record high and more than double second-
place Japan's GNP of just over $2 trillion. 
New Factors on the World Stage 
Any realistic assessment of the position of 
the United States in the world economy must 
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take account of important new factors in the 
economic equation. To a substantial degree, 
the impact of domestic considerations such 
as defense spending is overshadowed by the 
new competition from an array of developing 
countries that have joined, or are about to 
join, the club of advanced industrial nations. 
Changes in the economic power of 
individual nations make for a stronger 
international commercial system. 
Economic history provides a useful per-
spective. In the nineteenth century, Euro-
pean investors financed much of the canals, 
railroads, and heavy industry that enabled the 
United States to become a global economic 
power. But that also eliminated the Euro-
pean monopoly over the world economy. 
Nevertheless, Europe's international trade 
continued to rise substantially in absolute 
terms. Something similar is underway today. 
Investment funds provided by the United 
States and the other developed nations have 
helped to create a new set of actors on the 
world economic stage, mainly in the Asian 
rim. Once again, the return to the status quo 
ante is not in the cards. In the short run, the 
adjustments are painful to many established 
sectors of the more advanced societies. 
Over the long run, these changes in the 
economic power of individual nations make 
for a stronger international commercial sys-
tem. Our best customers today are the other 
advanced economies. The resulting ex-
panded flow of international trade and in-
vestment yields higher living standards for 
consumers in general. That was the experi-
ence of the nineteenth century, and it is being 
repeated as we approach the twenty-first cen-
tury. 
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Conclusion 
None of the foregoing discussion should 
be taken to minimize the importance of fiscal 
prudence. Of course the portion of our na-
tional resources devoted to military purposes 
should be carefully scrutinized; of course the 
serious shortcomings in the military pro-
curement process should be dealt with 
promptly. 
But the U.S. position in future interna-
tional rankings will depend in large measure 
on matters quite independent of the military. 
These include controlling production costs, 
enhancing productivity, improving the educa-
tion of our work force, and promoting na-
tional competitiveness in other ways. The 
outcome, given some tough decisions on 
public budgets and private productivity, is not 
likely to be as dismal as the doom peddlers 
would have us believe. 
One experienced observer, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, predicts that in the year 2010 the 
United States and the European Economic 
Community will be the two dominant forces 
in the world economy. In "America's New 
Geostrategy," an article that appeared in For-
eign Affairs last spring, he estimated that each 
will generate in that time period an annual 
GNP of approximately $8 trillion -- double or 
more that of Japan, China, or Russia. That 
result would not be too shabby for a nation so 
heavily criticized for "overstretch." If any-
thing, it is the Soviet Union -- which both de-
votes a far larger share of its national re-
sources to military purposes and suffers from 
a combination of low productivity, slow 
growth, and great pressures of unmet civilian 
needs -- that should be concerned about 
"overstretch," to say nothing of "imperial" 
overstretch. 
In sum, the U.S. military budget could 
vary over a considerable range without rais-
ing the specter of economic harm or national 
decline. This is not a plea for adopting the 
high end of that range, or for otherwise as-
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saying the desirable size of the military bud-
get. But the amount of resources that the 
United States devotes to defense programs 
should be determined primarily on non-eco-
nomic, and essentially political -- that is, na-
tional security -- grounds, with little fear of 
undermining this nation's position in the 
world. 
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